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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of EU integration and membership on the foreign 
policy of the Czech Republic. After examining the historical, geopolitical, and domestic 
sources of Czech foreign policy, it surveys Czech foreign policy since 1989, focusing 
on five distinct periods. The paper concludes that Czech foreign policy has been 
“Europeanized” to only a limited extent, and that EU influence on Czech foreign policy 
decision-making is relatively small compared to domestic political factors. EU 
membership also does not appear to have altered basic perceptions of Czech foreign 
policy interests, which remain largely determined by (pre-1989) historical experience 
and perceptions of geopolitical vulnerability. However, the Czech Republic has also 
sought to use the EU to achieve its key foreign policy goals, especially during its EU 
presidency in the first half of 2009. Limited socialization within EU institutions and the 
Czech Republic’s peculiar historical experience and geopolitical situation are the main 
explanations for limited Europeanization, suggesting that further socialization and the 
accumulated experience of EU membership could promote greater Europeanization of 
Czech foreign policy over time.  INTRODUCTION 
Among students of European politics there is a general consensus that membership in 
the European Union (EU) changes things in the countries that join it. What exactly 
changes, to what extent, and how or why these changes happen are all questions that are 
the subject of considerable debate within the broad field of “Europeanization” studies, 
along with the question of why some countries, policies, and institutions change more 
than others. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that EU membership does have 
consequences for domestic polities, policies, and politics. 
  To date, most Europeanization research has focused on the EU’s impact on 
domestic political institutions (executives, parliaments, courts, territorial politics) and 
politics (party systems, NGOs and interest groups, political culture). It has also focused 
heavily on the “communitized” policies of the EU’s first pillar – the policy areas in 
which decision-making proceeds according to the supranational “Community method” 
and in which the EU exerts the greatest influence (Major 2005). However, while it has 
received much less attention, Europeanization studies have also examined the EU effect 
in intergovernmental policy areas, especially foreign and security policy. These studies 
have generally concluded that EU membership also seems to affect the foreign policies 
and foreign policy behavior of member states. At a minimum, participation in the 
mechanisms of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) affects the institutional 
procedures by which by which governments make foreign policy decisions (M.E. Smith 
2000). Some have also argued that EU membership leads to the development of a 
“European reflex” (reflexe communautaire) – the predisposition to coordinate with other 
EU countries when it comes to foreign policy decisions (Tonra 2001). Going even 
further, others have argued that EU membership alters the substance of national foreign 
policies, leading to the increased convergence of national foreign policies and the 
emergence of shared European norms, interests, and identities that are replacing 
traditional national ones (Wong 2007, 325). Because of the intergovernmental nature of 
EU foreign policy, the main mechanism of Europeanization identified in the literature is 
the process of “socialization” – resulting from the increased interaction of national 
foreign ministries within the EU context and the gradual internalization by national 
officials of EU norms and expectations – rather than forced, formal adaptation to EU 
rules and requirements (Wong 2007: 333; Tonra 2000: 229; White 2001: 6; Major 2005: 
185-6).  
  1  The Europeanization literature also concludes that the impact of EU membership on 
foreign policy is greater for small member states than for large ones. As Tonra (2001) 
argues, this is because EU membership expands the foreign policy agendas and the 
range and depth of the foreign policies of small states; it thus enhances the influence of 
small states, and gives them access to decision making on issues they otherwise would 
have no say on. Nevertheless, as Larsen (2005) found in his study of Danish foreign 
policy, despite their small size and limited resources, even small member states retain 
separate foreign policy identities and interests within the EU context, with the relative 
influence of the EU (versus domestic or international factors) and the separateness of 
national foreign policies varying according to the issue area and the fit between EU 
policy and national interests and activities. 
  This paper examines the impact of EU membership on the foreign policy of the 
Czech Republic, a relatively small (or medium-sized) member state that joined the EU 
in 2004, after more than four decades of communist rule and inclusion in the Soviet 
sphere as part of Czechoslovakia. From the perspective of Europeanization, it seeks to 
answer several key questions: 1) How has EU integration and membership changed or 
altered Czech foreign policy? 2) What is the relative influence of the EU on Czech 
foreign policy compared to domestic (or international) factors? 3) To what extent is 
Czech foreign policy made through the EU, as opposed to without or outside of EU? 4) 
To what extent has EU influence on Czech foreign policy been affected (limited or 
enhanced) by the Czech Republic’s experience as a newly-independent state that has 
only recently regained its sovereignty in this crucial policy area? And finally, 5) How 
has the Czech Republic sought to influence EU foreign policy since it has become a 
member state, particularly during its EU presidency in the first half of 2009?  
  To answer these questions, the paper proceeds in chronological fashion, 
investigating Czech foreign policy as it has developed in five main periods: the initial 
years after the Velvet Revolution and separation from Slovakia (1990-1997); the initial 
years of the accession process, from the beginning of accession negotiations in 1998 
until their conclusion in late 2002; the brief, but notable, period between the conclusion 
of accession negotiations and formal entry into the EU (December 2002-May 2004); the 
initial years of EU membership (2004-2008); and the six-month period of the Czech EU 
presidency (January-June 2009) – obviously not concluded at the time this paper was 
written. The paper also concentrates on three key sets of issue that are of ongoing 
importance to Czech foreign policy: relations with eastern (and southeastern) Europe 
  2and Russia; transatlantic relations; and international organizations and law (including 
trade and human rights). Proceeding in such a fashion will allow us to trace the process 
of change in Czech foreign policy in each of these areas, and hopefully establish a 
causal relationship between these changes and EU influences, if indeed such a 
relationship exists. Before proceeding with the chronological narrative, however, we 
first provide a brief discussion of Czech foreign policy interests and their historical and 
geopolitical sources, as well as the main domestic factors affecting Czech foreign 
policy.  
 
CZECH FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Czech foreign policy interests are defined both by the country’s historical experiences 
and its present-day perceptions of vulnerability and weakness.
1 Historically, the Czech 
lands have been dominated by larger, more powerful neighbors – for centuries by 
Habsburg Austria, and then in the twentieth century by Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia. Until 1989, the only modern experiences of independent statehood came in the 
interwar period, 1918-1938, when a democratic Czechoslovak republic was created 
from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and then again briefly after the Second 
World War, from 1945 until the imposition of Soviet-backed communist rule in 1948. 
The legacy of external domination was then reinforced by Warsaw Pact military 
intervention to crush the “Prague Spring” reform movement in 1968.  
  These bitter historical experiences have underscored the main vulnerabilities and 
perceived weaknesses of the Czech Republic that would need to be addressed by Czech 
foreign policy after November 1989.
2 As a relatively small country in the center of 
Europe, the Czech Republic sought integration into Western (Euro-Atlantic) institutions 
to preserve its future security and independence, in the first instance against the possible 
threat of renewed Russian power and assertiveness. The small size of the Czech 
economy also necessitated integration into the larger European single market, which in 
turn offered both an entry into but also protection from the broader global economy. 
European integration also fulfilled an important psychological need for the Czech lands, 
which sought to reclaim their historic place at the heart of Europe and in the mainstream 
of European cultural and political developments. More recently, the Russian-Ukrainian 
gas crises in 2006 and 2009 have underscored the dependency of the Czech Republic on 
Russian oil and gas and its energy vulnerabilities more generally; this has led to strong 
  3Czech support for common European energy solutions, something which was a key 
theme of the Czech EU presidency in 2009.  
  However, while historical experience has underscored the need for Czech 
integration into Europe, it has also taught the Czechs not to rely on the protection of 
Western European powers alone, thus leading to a strong interest in close ties to the 
United States and good transatlantic relations. Czech support for NATO and 
maintaining a strong US security role in Europe is further bolstered by the perceived 
weakness and inadequacies of EU security and defense structures.  
  Czech foreign policy interests, therefore, as shaped by both historical experience 
and perceived vulnerabilities and weaknesses, can be briefly summarized as follows: the 
achievement of security and prosperity through integration into Western institutions and 
structures – in the first instance the EU, but also NATO with a strong transatlantic 
relationship as a counterbalancing influence and insurance policy. This balancing act in 
foreign relations can also be seen in Czech preferences for the EU, where the Czech 
Republic can be counted among the member states generally favoring a looser and more 
intergovernmental form of integration (although positions on this vary among the 
political parties). Czech “Euroskepticism” in this regard is also influenced by historical 
experience and geopolitical status, as it is based to some extent on the fear of external 
domination (by an EU controlled by larger countries) after having only recently 
regained full independence and sovereignty. Beyond the EU and transatlantic relations, 
the Czech historical experience of victimization and domination by larger powers has 
also made it a strong supporter of international law and organizations and a proponent 
of effective multilateral cooperation. On this latter point, however, as with Czech 
preferences for the EU and transatlantic relations, Czech foreign policy is influenced by 
the views of specific national governments and leadership elites. 
  A key question for this paper, therefore, is how has EU membership affected Czech 
perceptions of basic foreign policy interests? Has EU membership modified perceptions 
of national security, and of the proper balance between independence and integration, 
and between the EU and transatlantic relations? How has it affected Czech perceptions 
of the external (non-EU) environment, particularly its historically dangerous and 
unstable eastern and southeastern neighborhoods? And finally, how has it affected 
Czech perceptions of global problems and the potential role of the Czech Republic as an 
effective international actor 
 
  4Domestic factors 
Beyond history and geopolitics, Czech foreign policy is also influenced by a number of 
domestic factors. One of these is the constitutional structure of government, which 
creates three main centers of power when it comes to foreign policy: the president, 
prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs (Pehe 1998: 63). Although the Czech 
constitution gives the government ultimate constitutional responsibility for foreign 
policy, its Article 63 also assigns a foreign policy role to the president, who despite the 
rather ceremonial status of the office has more power in foreign policy than in other 
policy areas. As the official head of state, the president represents the country abroad, 
ratifies international treaties, appoints ambassadors, and is the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces. The rather vague constitutional delimitation of foreign policy 
competencies between the government and president has enabled the latter to play an 
active role in foreign policy, thus resuming the tradition of an active presidency 
established by the first Czechoslovak president T. G. Masaryk (1918-1935). However, 
this vagueness also has become an ongoing source of tension between the two centers of 
executive power – the government and the president. Both presidents since 1989 – 
Václav Havel (1989-2003) and Václav Klaus (2003-present) – have been very active in 
foreign policy, often supporting and promoting views that were not in line with the 
official foreign policy of the government. 
  The foreign policy views of the two presidents could not be more different, 
however. A key factor influencing Havel’s foreign policy views was the political 
thinking of Masaryk, whose political philosophy was deeply rooted in the universalist 
tradition emphasizing humanity and the importance of moral values in politics – a 
philosophy also known as “non-political politics” or “anti-politics” (Šedivý 1995: 63). 
Thus, after becoming president Havel emphasized such principles in international 
relations as the promotion of human rights, multilateralism, and international dialogue. 
He explained his approach as follows: 
 
  Many years of living under communism gave us certain experiences that the 
  noncommunist West (fortunately) did not have to go through. We came to 
  understand (or to be precise some of us did) that the only genuine values are those 
  for which one is capable, if necessary, of sacrificing something. The traditional 
  values of Western civilization – such as democracy, respect for human rights and 
  for the order of nature, the freedom of the individual, and the inviolability of his 
  5  property, the feeling of co-responsibility for the world, which means the awareness 
  that if freedom is threatened anywhere, it is threatened everywhere – all of these 
  things become values with moral, and therefore metaphysical, underpinnings. 
  Without intending to, the communists taught us to understand the truth of the world 
  not as a mere information about it, but as an attitude, a commitment, a moral 
  imperative (Havel 1994: 18). 
 
  Klaus’ foreign policy views, on the other hand, are influenced by his neoliberal 
economic thinking, and can be described in terms of the realist paradigm of 
international relations that is the polar opposite of Havel’s universalism (idealism). 
Among the key features of Klaus’ foreign policy philosophy are an emphasis on 
protecting national interests, a limited interest in multilateralism (exceptions being 
Czech membership in the EU and NATO), and the preference for an intergovernmental 
(as opposed to supranational) approach to European integration. Klaus personified and 
represented the shift in Czech foreign policy from idealism to realism that occurred after 
the June 1992 elections – a process completed by the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 
1993 and the coming to power of the new Klaus-led government of the Czech Republic 
(Šedivý 1995: 69).  
   Within the government, the prime minister and foreign minister each have a key 
role to play in making foreign policy. While as the head of government the prime 
minister sets the main objectives of foreign policy, the foreign minister also disposes of 
considerable authority and some independence in this area, creating the potential for 
disagreement if the two actors have differing views. The potential for disagreement is 
particularly acute when the two foreign policy actors come from different political 
parties, which is often the case in the multi-party coalition governments that are typical 
of the Czech Republic’s parliamentary system. Making matters worse, the Czech 
constitution does not provide for effective constitutional mechanisms to “ensure that all 
three centers of foreign policy [speak] the same language,” thus creating considerable 
potential for discord in cases of partisan or ideological differences between the 
individuals holding these positions (Pehe 1998: 63). 
  Further complicating things, the three foreign policy centers were extended to four 
in 1998 when Prime Minister Miloš Zeman divided the foreign policy portfolio between 
the foreign minister (Jan Kavan) and the newly established position of deputy prime 
minister for security and defense policy, held by Egon Lánský. This arrangement did 
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government in December 1999. However, another extension to four foreign policy 
centers took place in January 2007, when Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek established 
the position of deputy prime minister for European affairs. This new position, held by 
Alexandr Vondra, was given primary responsibility for EU affairs in the Czech 
Republic, with one of its major tasks being government preparations for the Czech EU 
presidency in 2009. 
  Given the nature of the Czech Republic’s parliamentary system and coalition 
government, political parties and party politics exert a major influence on foreign policy 
(Drulák 2008: 11). While the main political parties excepting the Communists – the 
Civic Democrats (ODS), Social Democrats (ČSSD), Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), 
and Greens – all accept the main integrationist and internationalist principles of Czech 
foreign policy, key differences of orientation have emerged between “Atlanticists,” who 
favor closer ties to the US over more EU integration – chiefly the ODS – and 
“Europeanists,” who favor closer European integration over perceived subordination to 
the US – mainly the  Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Greens. The 
Communists, for their part, adhere to an “autonomist” position that rejects membership 
in NATO and is more critical of the EU, a position shared to an increasing extent by 
President Klaus after 2003 (Drulák 2008: 7-10). These partisan differences have grown 
since the Iraq war in 2003 and EU accession in 2004, making domestic party politics an 
increasingly important factor affecting Czech foreign policy. In the early years after the 
Velvet Revolution, by contrast, the relative weakness of political parties, the strong 
cross-party consensus on joining the EU and NATO (excepting the Communists), and 
the still-developing nature of Czech political institutions (the parliament, state 
administration, etc.) gave leading individuals such as Havel and Klaus exceptional 
influence over foreign policy, imposing few domestic constraints on their decisions and 
lending special importance to their personal views and philosophies (Wallat 2001). 
  Public opinion is another important domestic factor affecting foreign policy. In the 
initial decade or so after the Velvet Revolution foreign and security policy were “on the 
fringe rather than at the center of Czech political and public debate,” thus limiting the 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy while reinforcing the role of key 
individuals (Wallat 2001: 27). The Czech public generally expressed satisfaction with 
the government’s foreign policy, and supported the main foreign policy goals of joining 
the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, differences among various societal groups existed. In 
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orientation tending to be more critical of the government and politics, including foreign 
policy (STEM 2003). Interest in foreign policy has grown in recent years, however, in 
connection with the two main foreign policy issues since 2003 – the US-led war in Iraq 
and the American plans for constructing missile defense facilities in the Czech Republic 
and Poland. Along with this growing public interest has come a growing divergence of 
public opinion on foreign policy. As a consequence, public opinion could become an 
increasingly important factor influencing Czech foreign policy in the future. 
 
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (1990-1997) 
In the immediate aftermath of the November 1989 Velvet Revolution, the main foreign 
policy priorities of the Czechoslovak government were establishing the country’s full 
independence and sovereignty and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. Achieving the former goals meant securing the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Czechoslovak soil (accomplished in June 1991) and abolition of the Warsaw Pact, 
which occurred in July 1991 due to joint pressure from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary. The idealistic political leadership of post-revolutionary Czechoslovakia – 
composed mainly of former dissidents and Charter 77 members such as President 
Václav Havel and Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier – also initially argued for the 
elimination of NATO and the replacement of Cold War military structures with a new 
pan-European security framework based on a reformed Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (CSFR 1990). The idea had gained almost no support 
among other European states, however, and by the end of 1990 Czechoslovak officials 
had already scaled back their plans for a pan-European security system and turned their 
attention to existing international institutions (Šedivý 1995: 61-9).  
  The main vehicle of post-communist Czechoslovakia’s “return to Europe” was 
membership in the European Community (EC), which the new government began to 
pursue as early as December 1989. In December 1990, Prague and the governments of 
Poland and Hungary opened negotiations on association agreements with the EC. The 
so-called Europe Agreements that were eventually signed in December 1991 offered the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) the gradual liberalization of trade and 
increased economic and political cooperation, but they did not include a statement 
offering these countries a firm prospect of EC membership, something which had been a 
major goal of the CEECs. In this regard, and in others (the maintenance by the EC of 
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were a disappointment. 
  To increase their joint prospects of success in negotiations with the Soviet Union 
and the EC, the Czechoslovak government sought closer cooperation with Poland and 
Hungary. An initial meeting between these governments – initiated by Havel and 
Dienstbier – took place in April 1990 in Bratislava, and in February 1991 the “Visegrad 
group” (named after the Hungarian town in which the meeting took place) was formally 
established as a framework for regional cooperation (Rhodes 1999: 51). 
  Establishment of the Visegrad group reflected the general preference of the early 
Czechoslovak leadership for cooperative and multilateral approaches to foreign policy 
and international relations. Overall, the Czechoslovak government pursued an 
“ambitious and idealist” foreign policy in the first year after independence. This 
included unsuccessful attempts to mediate international conflicts in the Middle East, 
Cambodia, and elsewhere; pleas for the West to increase its economic assistance to 
Russia; and support for German reunification, with Havel even issuing a controversial 
apology for Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of ethnic German after World War II. This 
agenda essentially reflected the idealistic (and moralistic) orientations and beliefs of 
Havel and the other former dissidents who were the major foreign policy decision-
makers at this time (Šedivý 1995: 63; Wallat 2001: 17-18). 
  Czechoslovak foreign policy began to take a more “realist” turn after 1990, 
however. The main reasons for this reorientation were the growing internal tensions 
between Czechs and Slovaks – which increasingly absorbed government attention, and 
would eventually lead to the breakup of the state in January 1993 – and a more unstable 
and threatening external environment, with the growing influence of hardliners and the 
military in the Soviet Union, exemplified by military interventions in Lithuania and 
Latvia in January 1991 and the failed coup attempt against President Gorbachev in 
August 1991, and conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Persian Gulf War in 1990/91 
also led to a positive reevaluation of NATO’s effectiveness, while the inability of the 
CSCE to deal with the conflicts in Yugoslavia led to a diminished view of that 
organization’s effectiveness and ability to provide security (Šedivý 1995: 68; Wallat 
2001: 18-19). Thus, the Czechoslovak government began moving away from its initial 
flirtation with European security alternatives and towards a full focus on NATO 
membership 
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The turn towards realism in Czech foreign policy was accelerated by the June 1992 
election of a new Czech government (which became the government of the Czech 
Republic after the Velvet Divorce with Slovakia in 1993). In contrast to the idealism 
and multilateralism of the Czechoslovak dissidents, the new leadership of Prime 
Minister Václav Klaus and Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec favored unilateralism, 
bilateralism, and a generally more narrow and pessimistic foreign policy approach 
(Šedivý 1995: 67-9; Wallat 2001: 20). This new approach included a more skeptical 
view of the EC (after October 1993 the EU), which the Thatcherite Klaus perceived as 
being too socialistic and bureaucratic, and posing a threat to national sovereignty and 
identity. Thus, while the government’s official goal of EU membership remained, Czech 
government actions (or lack of them, more precisely, when it came to making legal and 
institutional preparations for membership) led some to doubt the sincerity of this goal 
(Pehe 1995: 15). 
  The unilateralism of the Klaus government was also reflected in changing attitudes 
towards regional cooperation within the Visegrad framework. In contrast to Havel and 
the previous government, Klaus was basically opposed to closer cooperation within the 
(since 1993, with the addition of Slovakia) four-country Visegrad group, which he 
derided as a “poor man’s club.” Instead, he favored the development of a regional free-
trade zone within the framework of the Central European Free Trade Association 
(CEFTA). In January 1994, Klaus provoked the ire of other Visegrad governments by 
rejecting a joint approach at the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) summit in Prague, 
insisting instead on bilateral meetings with US President Clinton (Rhodes 1999: 52-3). 
  A major reason for the Klaus government’s rejection of Visegrad cooperation was 
its belief (mistaken, as it turned out) that the Czech Republic was more advanced than 
other post-communist states when it came to economic transformation, and thus was a 
front-runner among these countries in the race for EU membership. Regional 
cooperation with less advanced countries, the Klaus government felt, would only hold 
the Czech Republic back and delay its accession to the EU. This mistaken view was also 
supported by the fact that the geopolitical center of gravity of the Czech Republic had 
shifted westwards due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the split with 
Slovakia (Šedivý 1995: 67; Barany 1995: 56). In particular, the Klaus government 
appeared to agree with the view that new foreign policy opportunities for the Czech 
Republic had been created by the latter development. By detaching the Czech Republic 
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in eastern and southern Europe,” and by locating the new state further from the borders 
of the former Soviet Union, it was argued, the separation from Slovakia had removed a 
“major obstacle … to the possible speedy incorporation of the Czech Republic in 
Western structures” (Winkler 1996: 9). 
  The Czech Republic’s internationalist president, Václav Havel (1993-2003), was 
highly critical of the “go-it-alone” foreign policy of the Klaus government, and he 
sought to counterbalance it by inaugurating a new series of informal discussions among 
the presidents of the four Visegrad countries plus Germany, Austria, and Slovenia. The 
so-called Litomyšl meetings – named after the Czech location of the initial meeting in 
April 1994 – never amounted to much, however, mainly because the figures involved 
occupied largely ceremonial positions with little substantive executive power. Nor were 
the Litomyšl meetings successful in reviving the Visegrad process. If anything, their 
existence underscored the stagnation of the Visegrad forum and the Klaus government’s 
disinterest in regional cooperation, which the prime minister himself derided as “empty 
regionalism” (Rhodes 1999: 52-3). 
  Havel’s efforts notwithstanding, the uncooperative and sometimes arrogant foreign 
policy approach of the Klaus government led to a deterioration of the Czech Republic’s 
relations with most neighboring countries. This included relations with Germany, whose 
support the Czechs needed in order to secure the key goal of EU membership. Not only 
were Czech-German relations heavily freighted with mutual historical grievances, but 
the Euro-pessimistic views of Klaus also clashed directly with the more pro-European 
views of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Bilateral relations only began to improve 
with the signing of a new Czech-German declaration of goodwill in January 1997, 
following two years of contentious negotiations initiated by President Havel. Relations 
with Poland – the Czech Republic’s other large neighbor – also suffered, especially after 
the January 1994 PfP summit. Czech-Polish relations improved somewhat after 1995, 
but only once the Czech government began to view this as necessary to secure a place in 
the first waves of NATO and EU enlargement (Wallat 2001: 23; Pehe 1998). 
  In the end, the Czech Republic was formally invited, along with Poland and 
Hungary, to join NATO in July 1997 with formal accession occurring in March 1999. 
Thus, a major goal of Czech foreign policy was accomplished. However, while the 
Klaus government strongly favored NATO membership, there was not much public 
discussion of this objective domestically, and public support for NATO membership in 
  11the Czech Republic remained somewhat below what it was in Poland and Hungary.
3 
Replicating the EU situation, the Czech government’s official support for NATO 
membership was also not matched by military reforms and other preparations necessary 
for membership, generating some uncertainty about the country’s NATO bid until it was 
formally invited to join (Wallat 2001: 21). 
 
THE ACCESSION PROCESS (1998-2002) 
In this period, and until formal accession in May 2004, EU membership remained the 
key goal and pursuit of Czech foreign policy. At the same time, Czech foreign policy 
was being increasingly shaped by EU membership preparations and integration into the 
EU and NATO frameworks. Domestic factors also exerted a key influence over foreign 
policy however, especially elections and party politics. 
 
CFSP alignment and the accession process 
Integration into EU foreign policy actually began well before the formal launching of 
the accession process in 1998. In preparation for membership, the Czech Republic and 
other candidate states were expected to align themselves with EU policies and 
principles, in CFSP as in other areas. The process of foreign policy alignment was a key 
goal of the EU’s pre-accession strategy. According to a 1994 Commission document, 
“The goal for the period before accession should be the progressive integration of the 
political and economic systems, as well as the foreign and security policies of the 
[prospective candidate states] and the Union, together with increasing cooperation in 
the fields of justice and home affairs, so as to create an increasingly unified area 
(European Commission 1994: 1; emphasis added).  
  Because it is a matter of intergovernmental agreement, CFSP does not involve the 
legal instruments (directives, regulations) that exist for other EU policies. As a 
consequence, unlike other aspects of the acquis communautaire, there is no body of 
CFSP legislation and rules that must be transposed to national legislation and 
implemented by the candidate states. Instead, the acquis politique consists mainly of 
previous joint actions, common positions, statements, and declarations, all of which the 
candidate states are expected to accept. The candidate states must also align their own 
national policies to the basic principles and goals of CFSP. According to a 2002 
Commission document, “as member states [the candidate countries] must undertake to 
give active and unconditional support to the implementation of the common foreign and 
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that their national policies conform to the common positions and defend these common 
positions in international fora” (European Commission 2002: 81). Significant alignment 
with CFSP principles and positions is therefore expected of candidate states before 
accession. 
  For the Czech Republic and other CEECs, this process of alignment began with the 
Europe Agreements that were signed in December 1991. While the main focus of the 
Europe Agreements was the liberalization of trade, they also provided a framework for 
intensified political relations between individual CEECs and the EU, including 
institutionalized bilateral meetings at various levels to discuss matters of common 
concern. A key goal of this so-called “political dialogue” was closer cooperation on 
foreign policy matters (Bulletin of the European Communities, 12-1991: 95). 
  The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which accepted the idea of eastward 
enlargement in principle and issued the now famous “Copenhagen criteria” for 
membership, called for reinforcing this bilateral political dialogue with a multilateral 
cooperative framework. The multilateral political dialogue would cover a number of 
policy areas of common interest, including CFSP. It would include regular meetings 
between the presidents of the European Council and Commission with their 
counterparts from the associated CEECs, and the possibility of joint meetings of all the 
heads of state and government to discuss certain predetermined issues. For CFSP in 
particular, it would include: Troika meetings at the level of foreign ministers and a 
meeting at the political directors level during each six-month EU presidency; briefings 
at secretariat level after each General Affairs Council (foreign ministers) meeting and 
each meeting of the political directors; and one Troika meeting at working group level 
per presidency for relevant working groups (European Council 1993: 86 and 92).  
  In March 1994, the Council went even further and approved a plan for enhanced 
foreign policy cooperation with the associated CEECs. This plan included a number of 
elements: 
•  Yearly meetings between the rotating EU presidency, the Commission, and the 
heads of state or government of the CEECs.  
•  Briefings for CEEC ambassadors given by the EU presidency following each 
European Council meeting. 
•  Special General Affairs Council meetings with CEEC foreign ministers to discuss 
CFSP issues.  
  13•  Political directors’ meetings (in the form of sittings of the Political Committee) with 
the CEECs in advance of regular European Council meetings. 
•  Meetings of experts and special working groups to discuss CFSP issues, especially 
security, terrorism, and human rights. 
•  The opportunity for the CEECs to associate themselves jointly with EU statements 
on specific foreign policy issues and to jointly back démarches issued by the EU. 
•  The possibility of collective involvement by the CEECs in EU joint foreign policy 
actions.  
•  More formal cooperation between the EU and CEECs within international 
organizations and at international conferences, with the possibility that the CEECs 
would be invited to coordinate their positions with that of the EU. 
•  The appointment by the CEECs of “shadow European correspondents” in order to 
facilitate foreign policy coordination with the EU. 
•  The promotion of more regular contacts between the EU’s missions to non-member 
countries and international organizations and conferences and CEEC missions. 
•  The possibility of increased cooperation between the diplomatic services of the 
member states, the Commission, and the CEECs (Bulletin of the European Union, 3-
1994, 68).  
  The goal of integrating the CEECs into CFSP was also emphasized by the Essen 
European Council in December 1994. At Essen, the European Council approved a 
Commission report outlining a general pre-accession strategy for the EU. The report 
stated that with respect to CFSP the primary objectives of this strategy were: 1) 
spreading stability and security throughout the post-communist zone in Europe by 
making the CEECs feel more included in the Western security sphere; and 2) 
familiarizing the CEECs with CFSP procedures and providing them an opportunity to 
align with EU positions and policies (European Council 1994: 159).  
  Performance in terms of alignment with CFSP goals and principles was an 
important factor examined by the Commission in the formal accession process (which 
began in March 1998 for some candidate countries and ended in December 2002 for all 
but Bulgaria and Romania). In the Commission’s formal “Opinions” on the applications 
of each of the ten CEECs that were published in June 1997, the foreign policies of each 
applicant were briefly evaluated along with their ability to fulfill EU obligations in this 
area. In the case of the Czech Republic, the Commission noted approvingly the Czech 
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for CFSP actions; its membership in international organizations, including the UN and 
OSCE, and its preparations for NATO and WEU membership; its participation in 
NATO operations in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR); its resolution of territorial disputes with 
neighboring countries; its sizable diplomatic service, giving it the potential to play a role 
in CFSP as a member state; and its support for WMD non-proliferation treaties and 
export-control regimes for dual-use technologies. The Commission reported that it 
found no serious problems in the CFSP area, leading it to conclude that, “as a member 
[the Czech Republic] could effectively fulfill its obligations in [the CFSP] field” 
(European Commission 1997: 73).  
  The Commission also evaluated the foreign policy performance and alignment with 
CFSP of each candidate state in the annual “Progress Reports” on preparations for 
accession that it published for each applicant, beginning in November 1998. In its 
progress reports for the Czech Republic for 1998-2002, the Commission noted generally 
satisfactory progress in aligning Czech foreign policy with CFSP, and with 
administrative and legislative adaptations that would allow the Czech Republic to more 
effectively participate in CFSP once it became a member. Among the former was the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in spring 2000 to create the 
posts of Political Director and European Correspondent, and the creation in May 2002 
of a department for CFSP matters within the MFA.
4  
  Alignment with CFSP proved to be a relatively easy task for the candidate states, 
and the CFSP chapter was among the first to be “provisionally closed” by most CEECs 
in formal accession negotiations with the EU. In the Commission’s December 2002 
chapter-by-chapter “Guide to the Negotiations,” it was reported that “All candidate 
countries have accepted the [CFSP] acquis and there is a good level of alignment with 
basic principles” (European Commission 2002: 81). In its November 2003 
“Comprehensive Monitoring Report,” the final assessment issued by the Commission 
before formal accession in May 2004, the Commission noted some remaining 
adjustments to domestic legislation that needed to be made to enable the Czech 
Republic to participate in EU economic sanctions measures, and it urged enhanced 
implementation of EU arms export measures. Nonetheless, it concluded: “The Czech 
Republic is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the 
accession negotiations in the chapter on the [CFSP], and it is expected to be able to 
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restrictive measures by accession” (European Commission 2003: 50). 
 
The Tošovský and ČSSD minority governments (1998-2002) 
The accession and alignment process coincided with a sharp change in the style and 
substance of Czech foreign policy, but these were largely the product of domestic 
politics rather than external influences. The fall of the Klaus government in late 1997 
led to an interim caretaker government under the leadership of National Bank Governor 
Josef Tošovský. New national elections in June 1998 then resulted in the formation of a 
minority coalition government led by the Social Democrats, who continued governing 
until 2006 (after winning re-election in 2002). Both the Tošovský and ČSSD 
governments rededicated the Czech Republic to the goal of EU membership, and they 
sought to improve Czech relations with the EU, which had been strained under Klaus. In 
contrast to the previous Klaus government, the two governments also gave renewed 
emphasis to multilateralism and participation in international organizations. They also 
revived the process of central European regional cooperation within the Visegrad 
format, and they endeavored to improve relations with neighboring countries.
5 In March 
1999, the ČSSD overcame its initial skepticism about NATO and led the Czech 
Republic into the Western military alliance. 
 However,  the  ČSSD’s skepticism about NATO membership – which mirrored 
broader public opinion – as well as broad public sympathy for Serbia-Yugoslavia (a 
legacy of the communist period, when many Czechs vacationed in the former 
Yugoslavia), contributed to an uncertain response by the Czech government to NATO’s 
March 1999 decision to launch air strikes against Serbia in defense of the Kosovar 
Albanians. After some hesitancy, and initial denial that it had agreed to the air strikes, 
the Czech government finally voiced its support for NATO’s actions. However, it also 
launched an unsuccessful mediation attempt with Greece, another pro-Serbia country, in 
an effort to end the air strikes and reach a peace agreement. The Czech hesitancy over 
the Kosovo war also reflected a split in the governing ČSSD between pro-NATO 
“internationalists” and “Europeanists,” as well as conflicting external constraints 
imposed by the need to cooperate with an internationalist president (Havel) and the 
Atlanticist ODS, which was supporting the minority government through an opposition 
agreement (Drulák 2008: 8). 
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into NATO and EU foreign policy, the Czech Republic became an increasingly active 
player in this region after 1998. Having already supplied troops for NATO operations in 
Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) beginning in 1996, the Czech government also contributed to the 
NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR) in 1999 and Macedonia (Operation “Essential 
Harvest”) in 2001. In late 2002, it agreed to contribute officers to the new EU police 
mission in (EUPM) in Bosnia. The Czech Republic was also an active participant in the 
EU-led Stability Pact for the Western Balkans that was launched in 1999, initially as an 
observer and from 2001 as a full member. It also contributed to OSCE election observer 
missions in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Bosnia.  
  Even though it was not yet a member of the EU, the Czech Republic also became 
an active and interested participant in efforts to develop the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) beginning in 1999. At the first ESDP Capabilities Commitment 
Conference in November 2000 and the follow-up Capabilities Improvement Conference 
in November 2001, it offered 1,000 troops for the planned EU Rapid Reaction Force 
and 100 policemen for the EU police force. By contributing officers to the EU police 
mission in Bosnia in 2002, it became a part of the first ESDP operation. Nevertheless, 
the Czech government remained somewhat ambivalent about ESDP, fearing that it 
could compete with and undermine NATO. Within NATO, meanwhile, outside of the 
Balkans the Czech Republic also contributed to NATO forces in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 
2002. 
  Also reflecting the multilateralist orientation of the post-Klaus governments, the 
Czech Republic took on a more active role in other international organizations after 
1997, including the OSCE, Council of Europe, and the UN. In particular the Czech 
Republic began to carve out for itself a prominent role in promoting human rights, 
viewing this as an area in which it could add value due to its experience as a former 
totalitarian country that had successfully managed the transition to democracy (Šedivý 
2003: 9). The country’s active role in this field was also strengthened by the distinctive 
reputation of President Václav Havel as a worldwide human rights campaigner. In 
focusing on international human rights, the Czech government reengaged on an issue 
that had been a hallmark of the first post-communist government of Czechoslovakia.
6  
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Efforts to develop a common European foreign policy encountered a major setback with 
the intra-European split on Iraq that emerged in early 2003. In this dispute, the Czech 
Republic and nine other CEEC’s joined several Western European countries (and a 
number of prospective candidates for EU membership from the western Balkans) in 
backing the US position on Iraq, which endorsed the possible use of force against Iraq 
without a further UN Security Council Resolution. The split first emerged into the open 
with a letter published in the Wall Street Journal on 30 January that expressed solidarity 
with the US position on Iraq. The letter was signed by Czech President Havel and the 
leaders of Poland, Hungary, and five EU member states (the UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
and Denmark). This was followed one week later by the release of a memorandum 
backing US policy that was signed by the governments of seven other CEECs (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia) as well as Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Albania. 
  The letter and memorandum provoked an immediate and strong response from 
some EU member states, especially the French government, which was leading the anti-
war bloc. One consequence was that the candidate states were barred from attending an 
emergency EU summit in Brussels on February 17, whose goal was to forge a united 
EU position on the Iraq issue. France and Germany in particular felt that the presence of 
these governments would only strengthen the pro-US position of British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair. Then, at a post-summit press conference French President Chirac launched 
a memorable tirade against the CEECs, calling their actions “dangerous, reckless, not 
very well behaved.” The behavior of the CEECs, he continued, was “childish” and they 
were “badly brought up.” They “had missed a great opportunity to shut up.” Moreover, 
Chirac warned the CEECs that their entry into the EU was not yet assured, with the 
national parliaments of member states still required to ratify the Accession Treaties for 
each of the candidate countries (which, in fact, had not yet been formally signed; this 
would happen on 16 April 2003, at an EU summit meeting in Athens, Greece) 
(Dempsey 2003: 4). 
  The initial Czech response to this attack was equally sharp. According to Czech 
foreign minister Cyril Svoboda, “We are not joining the EU so we can sit and shut up” 
(Parker and Blitz 2003: 4). Moreover, the Czechs and other CEECs defended 
themselves against the accusation that they had not properly aligned themselves with 
EU policy by pointing out, quite correctly, that prior to the February 17 joint declaration 
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on Iraq for the CEECs to ignore or break from. What existed instead were a collection 
of diverse national views that were coalescing around two poles: an anti-war position 
championed by France and Germany (with Belgium also playing a vocal role), and a 
pro-US view endorsing the possible use of military force that was advocated by the UK, 
Spain, and Italy. In siding with the latter position, the CEECs were not breaking from an 
established common position of the EU, but from the Franco-German position that was 
consolidated at the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Elysee Treaty in mid-January 
2003. Chirac’s pique over the behavior of the CEECs was probably as much a response 
to this overt rebellion against Franco-German leadership as anything, since it 
substantiated the fears of many French political elites that enlargement would 
undermine traditional Franco-German (read French) leadership of Europe and lead to 
the emergence of a more loosely governed and less cohesive EU. At any rate, after the 
February 17 summit, after being briefed by the EU, the Czech Republic and other 
CEECs uniformly endorsed the joint declaration on Iraq that was agreed to by the 
member states (RFE/RL 2003a). 
  Following the emergency EU summit, in subsequent days and weeks the Czech 
government backtracked to a more centrist position, in some cases trying to place 
themselves, as Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla (2002-2004) put it, “precisely in 
the middle between the US and EU.” While the Czech government contributed troops to 
the US-led coalition in Iraq,
7 it also avoided making strong public statements of support 
for war. This re-positioning no doubt reflected a desire to repair relations with France 
and Germany, but it also took into account intense public opposition to the war in the 
Czech Republic.
8 As with the Kosovo war, the ambivalence of the Social Democrats on 
Iraq also reflected internal party divisions between internationalists and Europeanists, as 
well as the influence of more internationalist coalition partners – the Christian 
Democrats, who were the party of Foreign Minister Svoboda, and the Freedom Union-
Democratic Union (US-DEU) (Drulák 2008: 8).  
  The Czech repositioning also reflected the circumstances which had placed Prague 
in the pro-US camp to begin with: the January letter had been signed by President 
Havel, not the Czech prime minister or any other representative of the Czech 
government, and he had done so on his own initiative, without prior consultation with 
the government. Moreover, Havel himself was in his final days as president, to be 
succeeded in February by Klaus. The rebalancing of Czech policy on Iraq, therefore, 
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for the US by a lame duck president. This new balance was also reflected by the views 
of the new President Klaus, who on an April 2003 trip to Germany argued that while he 
was personally opposed to the Iraq war he did not want a confrontation with the United 
States, nor did he want the Czech Republic to be forced to choose between the Franco-
German or US-UK camps (EUobserver 2003).  
  As the blow-up over Iraq subsided, the Czech government continued seeking a 
balanced position between the Franco-German and Atlanticist camps. The Czechs were 
critical of Franco-German efforts, at a 29 April mini-summit Brussels (also attended by 
the leaders of Belgium and Luxembourg), to create new military planning structures for 
the EU outside of NATO. The Czech government was also critical of a compromise 
plan agreed to in November 2003 by the UK, France, and Germany for a separate EU 
military headquarters, arguing that it would be a wasteful duplication of resources and 
would ultimately undermine NATO and the transatlantic alliance (RFE/RL 2003b). 
However, it regarded the agreement that was eventually reached in 2004, on the creation 
of a small EU civil-military planning cell linked to NATO, as an acceptable 
compromise.  
  At the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, tasked with developing 
guidelines for a new constitutional treaty for the EU, and in which the Czech Republic 
and other accession states participated as observers, there was general Czech support for 
strengthening CFSP, including merging the functions of the High Representative for 
CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations to create the new post of European 
Foreign Minister, and the use of “enhanced cooperation” procedures to make decisions 
when not all member states were in agreement. However, the Czech government 
continued to have concerns about the development of ESDP. The Czech Republic, along 
with most other CEECs, opposed the creation of independent European defense 
structures outside of the NATO framework, which they feared would undermine NATO 
and the transatlantic relationship and weaken the US security commitment to Europe 
(Moťková and Khol 2003). Instead, the Czech government preferred the development of 
a stronger EU defense identity within NATO, as foreseen by the December 2002 
“Berlin-Plus” agreement permitting the use of NATO assets by EU security operations 
(Cameron and Primatarova 2003: 5). 
  After the signing of the Accession Treaty on 17 April 2003, the Czech Republic 
and other accession states graduated to the status of “active observers” in the CFSP. 
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to shape CFSP from the inside rather than simply being informed about decisions after 
they had been made. Full voting rights in CFSP decision-making would have to await 
formal accession in May 2004, however. 
 
THE INITIAL YEARS OF MEMBERSHIP (May 2004-2008) 
Since becoming a member state the Czech Republic has sought to maintain its “careful 
balancing act between Atlanticist and European security profiles” (Khol 2008: 84). It 
has remained a strong supporter of NATO, and Czech forces have participated in NATO 
operations in Kosovo (KFOR), Iraq (NTM-I), and Afghanistan (ISAF). The Czech 
Republic also contributes troops to and is a strong supporter of the NATO Response 
Force. 
  However, relations with the US were affected by the controversy over American 
missile defense plans that ignited in summer 2006, with reports that the Pentagon had 
requested money for the construction of missile defense facilities in central Europe and 
a visit by US experts to survey potential sites in the Czech Republic. While discussions 
with the United States on the missile defense plans were begun by the ČSSD-led 
government, the project was also supported by the ODS-led coalition government that 
was formed in 2007 after parliamentary elections the previous year. However, the 
missile defense plans faced substantial public opposition, as well as opposition from the 
main non-government parties (the ČSSD and the Communists). Many in the EU were 
also upset by the Czech government’s decision to negotiate bilaterally with the United 
States without consulting other European countries. An agreement on the construction 
of missile defense facilities was signed by the US and Czech governments in July 2008. 
However, in early 2009 the Czech government faced the prospect that the new Obama 
administration might cancel the missile defense plans as part of a broader agreement 
with Russia entailing Moscow’s support for other US objectives (pressure on Iran to end 
its uranium enrichment program, the war in Afghanistan, etc.).
9  
  While NATO remained the primary security reference for the Czech Republic after 
2004, the Czech Republic has also gradually warmed to the idea of a stronger ESDP, 
especially one more engaged in the tasks of conflict prevention, crisis management, and 
post-conflict resolution. The Czech Republic has participated in all ESDP operations in 
the Balkans: Concordia and Proxima in Macdonia, the EU police mission in Bosnia, and 
Althea in Bosnia, where the EU took over the NATO mission led by SFOR. The Czech 
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multinational “battle groups,” agreeing with Germany and Austria to form one such 
group by 2009 (later postponed to 2011), and with Slovakia on another to be formed by 
2009. It has also played an active role in the European Capabilities Action Plan (Khol 
2008: 92-3). The Czech Republic also participated in the EU’s civilian mission in 
Kosovo beginning in December 2008, so far the largest ESDP operation ever launched. 
  While Czech support for ESDP increased under the leadership of the center-left 
government that was formed after the June 2002 parliamentary elections, it was also 
influenced by strong public opposition to the US-led war in Iraq. Czech support for 
ESDP dissipated somewhat after the 2006 parliamentary elections and the formation in 
2007 of an ODS-led government that was decidedly more Atlanticist and pro-US in 
orientation. However, a sharp swing in policy was blocked by the inclusion in the 
government coalition of the Christian Democrats and Greens, both more favorably 
disposed to increased EU cooperation in foreign and defense policy. While overall 
Czech support for ESDP has grown since accession, the Czech Republic nevertheless 
continues to view NATO as the main security framework for Europe, although it favors 
a stronger EU identity and role within NATO.
10 
  Since becoming a member state, the Czech Republic has sought an active profile 
within CFSP. Key regional priorities for Czech foreign policy are the Western Balkans 
and the Eastern European neighborhood, including the Southern Caucasus. The Czechs 
have been strong supporters of the stabilization and association process in the Western 
Balkans, and all Czech ESDP deployments have been in this region. It also strongly 
supports further EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, with its preferred candidates 
for membership being Croatia followed by Serbia and Montenegro. The Czech Republic 
followed the lead of the United States and major European powers in recognizing 
Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, although not without some hesitation – the 
result of traditional ties to Serbia, sensitivity to neighboring Slovakia’s critical position 
due to concerns about separatism within its own borders, and historically-based 
objections to large powers deciding the fate of smaller countries (analogy with Munich 
1938). President Klaus also opposed the government’s recognition of Kosovo (EU 
Consent 2008: 75). There are split views among and within political parties on Turkish 
membership, however, with the ČSSD for, the Christian Democrats against, the ODS 
divided (ODS Prime Minister Topolánek has spoken in favor of Turkey, as has 
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Consent 2008: 76).
11 
  In Eastern Europe, the Czech government has been a strong supporter of the EU’s 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), initiated in 2004, and the follow-up Eastern 
Partnership Initiative that was proposed by Poland and Sweden in May 2008 (see next 
section). In general, however, the Czech government has argued that the EU has not 
paid enough attention and devoted sufficient resources to its eastern neighbors, 
compared to its southern (North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean) neighborhood. In 
recent years the Czech Republic has played a key role in promoting democracy and 
human rights in Belarus. It also has strong bilateral ties to Ukraine, including regular 
consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries and projects that assist 
Ukraine in aligning its legislation with EU rules (for instance, nuclear safety and 
phytosanitary standards).  
  A key instrument of the Czech government in pushing its Eastern policy interests 
within the EU has been the Visegrad group, which the Czech Republic and the other 
three Visegrad states have reinvigorated since 2004 as a means of cooperating and 
exerting greater joint influence within the EU and over CFSP (Dangerfield 2008). A 
major focus of Visegrad Group (V4) activities has been the improvement of ties to the 
Eastern neighbors. During its one-year presidency of the Visegrad Group (June 2007-
June 2008), the Czech Republic pursued a special liaison program with Ukraine that had 
been previously launched in 2005, as well as ongoing programs aimed at improving 
relations with Moldova and promoting democratization in Belarus. It also prioritized 
building stronger ties to and encouraging reform in the Southern Caucasus, where 
Georgia is an especially important partner (EU Consent 2008: 117).
12 Czech Eastern 
policies within the V4 arrangement were later elevated to the EU level, as priorities for 
the Czech EU presidency in the first half of 2009. 
  The Czech Republic has adopted a generally critical or cautious stance towards 
Russia common to the post-communist new member states, although it is not as hostile 
towards Russia as Poland and the Baltic states. Some improvement in Czech-Russian 
relations began in 2003, with the fall visit of President Klaus to Russia, followed by the 
March 2006 visit by Russian President Putin to Prague. However, Czech-Russian 
relations cooled under the impact of successive natural gas disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine (in 2006 and 2009) that affected Czech energy supplies and Russia’s military 
incursion into Georgia in August 2008. The Czech government condemned the Russian 
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Czechoslovakia. However, President Klaus was more sympathetic to the Russian view 
that Georgia bore substantial responsibility for the war (Drulák 2008: 26-7). 
Continuing a trend established after 1997, as an EU member state the Czech 
Republic has continued its active engagement on international human rights issues, 
within the UN, Council of Europe, the OSCE and other international organizations. As 
the government stated in its 2005 Report on Czech Foreign Policy, “Promoting human 
rights principles in multilateral forums (…) has become an enduring priority of Czech 
foreign policy” (MFA 2005: 327). The Czech Republic became especially vocal over 
the human rights situation in Cuba. In 2005, it supported the view that sanctions applied 
to Cuba in 2003 should be prolonged. Although it failed to convince other member 
states on this issue and the sanctions were suspended, it successfully pressed for a 
toughening-up the EU communiqué to the Cuban government, which appealed for the 
release of political prisoners and condemned the persecution of political opponents and 
foreign visitors. Despite being in the minority on this issue, the Czech Republic 
continued its critical approach toward the EU’s dialogue with Cuba in subsequent years. 
In June 2008, the Czech government unsuccessfully opposed the formal lifting of EU 
sanctions against Cuba, although it was able to secure the attachment of a number of 
“political conditions” to this action (Euractiv 2008a). The Czech Republic has also been 
a strong supporter and participant in UN activities in the areas of conflict prevention, 
post-conflict stabilization, assistance to refugees and humanitarian aid, the fight against 
international crime and the drug trade, and economic development (MFA 2003: 110) 
 
THE CZECH EU PRESIDENCY (January-June 2009) 
Under slogan “Europe without barriers” the Czech Republic assumed the EU’s rotating 
presidency in January 2009, becoming only the second Central and Eastern European 
new member state to do so (following Slovenia, in the first half of 2008). Among the 
benefits of the EU presidency is the opportunity to set (or at least greatly influence) the 
EU’s policy agenda for the six-month period. In its “Work Program” for the EU 
presidency, the Czech government set three key priorities, the so-called three E’s – 
Economy, Energy, and EU in the World (Czech EU Presidency 2009a). While the latter 
priority explicitly targeted external policy, the other two also had important 
international dimensions that reflected Czech foreign policy interests. 
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presidency in the midst of global economic and financial crisis. It therefore sought to 
achieve coordinated European action to restore economic growth, but also to ensure that 
the EU made a coordinated contribution to global efforts at financial system reform, 
especially at the April G-20 summit in London. The Czech government also pledged to 
fight against protectionist impulses in the EU and globally, and to push for the extension 
of the global free trade system. 
  Under the second priority (Energy), the Czech government sought to promote both 
internal and external EU measures to improve energy security. Externally, this included 
efforts to improve relations with foreign energy suppliers, and to diversify sources and 
suppliers of energy. In this context, the Czech government placed special emphasis on 
advancing plans for construction of the “southern corridor,” a pipeline system for 
transporting oil and natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe that would bypass 
Russia. This goal was a clear reflection of Czech national interests, given the country’s 
heavy dependence on Russian oil and gas.
13 The Czech government also pledged to 
help build a consensus for a new global climate change treaty, possibly to be signe
December 2009 in Copenhagen. 
d in 
  Regarding the priority of EU in the World, the Czech government promised to push 
for further enlargement, with an immediate focus on Croatia. It also emphasized 
continued support for the Stability and Association process in the Western Balkans. 
While promising to continue to support the Southern dimension of the European 
Neighborhood Policy, the Czech government indicated that it would give special 
emphasis to the Eastern dimension of ENP, promising to push forward the Eastern 
Partnership Initiative that had been proposed by Poland and Sweden in May 2008. The 
Czech government also pledged to help develop a unified EU approach to Russia. 
Improved transatlantic relations were also high on the external policy agenda of the 
Czech EU presidency, especially given the recent election of the internationalist Barack 
Obama as the new US president, as was more effective cooperation between the EU and 
NATO on defense. The Czech government also pledged to support EU efforts to 
promote international development, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as 
well as its work in the areas of conflict resolution, nuclear non-proliferation, and the 
struggle against terrorism. 
  Overall, the Czech EU presidency priorities reflected an internationalist orientation 
with an Atlanticist tinge that was characteristic of the ODS-Christian Democrat-Green 
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considerable doubt over whether Prague could handle the job, particularly in the midst 
of global economic crisis and with Europe facing the challenge of an increasingly 
assertive Russia. This doubt stemmed from the country’s small size and its relative 
inexperience within the EU and on the global diplomatic stage. Also creating doubt, 
however, was Czech domestic politics and the fragile situation of the Topolánek 
government, which enjoyed only a narrow margin of support in the Chamber of 
Deputies and was bedeviled by sharp domestic disputes over ratification of the Lisbon 
treaty and US missile defense plans. On top of everything else, there was the 
uncomfortable presence of President Klaus, one of Europe’s most outspoken 
Euroskeptics and a vocal opponent of the Lisbon treaty, as well as a prominent critic of 
efforts to combat global climate change. Despite his limited constitutional powers the 
unpredictable Czech president was nonetheless capable of embarrassing the Czech 
government and the EU, which in fact he succeeded in doing at times throughout the 
next several months.
14 Klaus also played a key role in engineering the no-confidence 
vote that brought down the Topolánek government in late March, thereby undermining 
the Czech government’s ability to conduct an effective EU presidency in its final 
months. Reflecting these doubts, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country had 
just concluded a dynamic EU presidency in the second half of 2008, openly questioned 
the Czech government’s capacity to lead the EU and suggested continued French 
leadership, on economic issues in particular, through Paris’ chairmanship of the 
Eurogroup (the 16 EU countries using the Euro) (Euractiv 2008b; Traynor 2009a). 
  The Czech EU presidency also had the misfortune of beginning amidst twin 
international crises – as if the global economic crisis was not enough – that severely 
tested the Topolánek government’s leadership skills while deflecting attention and effort 
from its stated priorities. In early January, the Israeli incursion into Gaza sparked 
international condemnation and outrage; simultaneously, another dispute between 
Russia and Ukraine over natural gas payments caused sharp drops in supplies to many 
EU countries. The initial Czech government response to these crises was inauspicious: a 
government spokesman excused the Israeli attacks as “defensive,” prompting criticism 
from other member states and a correction by Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg,
15 
while another dismissed the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute as a “bilateral” matter for the 
two governments to resolve themselves, despite its obvious impact on European 
consumers (Peel 2008: 3). Czech efforts to lead an EU response to the Gaza crisis were 
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government soon regained its footing and made a credible effort to intermediate the 
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, with a final resolution occurring in late January. Soon 
afterwards, however, it had to endure further criticism from Sarkozy, who clamed that 
the Czech presidency was too passive and slow in its response to the economic crisis 
(Erlanger 2009).   
  Although at the time of writing the Czech EU presidency is not yet completed, it is 
possible to offer a mid-term assessment of what it has or has not been able to 
accomplish in terms of foreign policy. Regarding its first priority – Economy – the 
small size of the Czech economy meant that much of the initiative in dealing with the 
global economic crisis would come from the larger EU member states, especially 
Britain, Germany, and France. On the whole, the ODS-led government opposed large-
scale stimulus spending and stricter regulation of financial markets as the best response 
to the crisis, arguing instead for more market liberalization (Topolanek 2009: 11). The 
Czech government was also a key voice against protectionist trends in the EU, most 
notably in its strong response to the French government’s automotive industry rescue 
plan, which was accompanied by Sarkozy’s calls for French automakers to repatriate 
jobs to France from lower-wage new member states such as the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. It also joined with Poland to oppose a coordinated EU aid plan for troubled 
Central and Eastern European member states (Hungary, Romania, the Baltic states), 
claiming that such a regional approach failed to differentiate among the new member 
states and obscured the relatively healthy economic situation of the two countries 
(Euractiv 2009a). 
  The Czech EU presidency has achieved some progress on energy security, perhaps 
aided by the useful demonstration effect of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. In late March, 
as part of a broader EU stimulus package, the Czech government secured funding (€200 
million) for the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which would provide an alternative route 
for Caspian basin energy that bypassed Russia, overcoming initial opposition from 
Germany (Euractiv 2009b). It also managed to achieve agreement between the Council, 
European Parliament, and Commission on the Commission’s proposed third energy 
legislative package, aimed at liberalizing the internal market for gas and electricity and 
promoting greater solidarity among member states in the face of energy supply threats 
(Czech EU Presidency 2009b). It also scheduled for May 8 in Prague a “southern 
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southern corridor countries. 
  Progress was also achieved on the external policy front, where the Czechs 
succeeded in gaining formal approval (and funding of €600 million) for the Eastern 
Partnership Initiative in late March, with plans to formally launch the initiative at a 
summit meeting in Prague on May 7. In the negotiations preceding approval of the 
initiative, the Czechs and likeminded governments successfully argued for the inclusion 
of Belarus in return for progress on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
However, an invitation to Belarus’ authoritarian president, Alexander Lukashenko, to 
attend the launch summit in May is jeopardized by the possibility that his government 
will submit to Russian pressure and formally recognize the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions of Georgia that were occupied by Russian 
forces during the August 2008 conflict. The Czechs were also successful in bringing the 
Western Balkans back to the forefront of the EU’s agenda, including a push for visa-
free travel to the EU for the countries of this region by the end of 2009. On the minus 
side, a unified EU approach to Russia failed to materialize during the Czech EU 
presidency. 
  Czech efforts to strengthen transatlantic relations were buoyed when the 
government succeeded in persuading President Obama to visit Prague for a US-EU 
summit in early April, following his previously scheduled visits to London for the G-20 
summit and Strasbourg/Kehl for the NATO summit. However, Czech efforts to seize the 
initiative on US-EU relations were undercut by the collapse of the government just days 
before the president’s visit, as well as by Prime Minister Topolánek’s unfortunate 
description, in a speech to the European Parliament on March 25, of Obama’s economic 
stimulus plan as the “road to hell” (Traynor 2009b). Even before this point, however, 
relations between the US administration and the Czech government were strained by 
signals that the Obama administration was reconsidering US missile defense plans in 
Central Europe, which the Topolánek government supported and had invested much 
political capital in defending against substantial domestic opposition.  
The Czech EU presidency also failed in its efforts to launch a major declaration on 
human rights on the occasion of the Prague summit. The text was prepared by former 
president Havel at the request by Deputy Prime Minister Vondra, Havel’s close friend 
from their pre-1989 dissident days and his former foreign policy advisor (1990-1992). 
In the document, Havel wrote that “the EU and USA are determined to thoroughly 
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the Russian Federation, Belarus, Burma, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan and in other 
countries where many free-thinking and honest people suffer for their views.” In the 
end, however, the government, which had already been voted out of office, did not have 
the strength or courage to convince its EU partners (many of whom are opposed to 
strong statements on Russia) to support the text. Havel had the opportunity to present 
his ideas to President Obama, however, with whom he met for a private conversation at 
the end of the summit (Nosálková 2009). 
  The collapse of the Topolánek government led to the April 6 agreement by the 
parliamentary parties to appoint a technocratic government – dominated by the ODS 
and ČSSD – that would govern through the end of the EU presidency (June 30) and 
until new parliamentary elections in the fall (probably 9-10 October). As a consequence, 
Czech foreign policy could also be affected. While the non-partisan head of the Czech 
Statistical Office, Jan Fischer, was nominated to be prime minister of the caretaker 
government, at the insistence of the Social Democratic leader Jiří Paroubek, 
Schwarzenberg was forced to resign as foreign minister and Social Democrat Jan 
Kohout, the deputy foreign minister and former Czech ambassador to the EU, was 
named as his replacement. The ČSSD also named a new deputy minister for European 
affairs, meaning that the Social Democrats would control the main foreign policy 
positions in the caretaker government outside of the prime minister, indicating a 
possible shift in Czech foreign policy priorities. However, the agreement on a 
technocratic government (to be confirmed by parliamentary vote in early May) also 
meant that President Klaus would have less opportunity to place his own imprint on the 
remaining days of the Czech EU presidency and Czech foreign policy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
EU integration has clearly had an impact on Czech foreign policy. As a condition of 
membership, the Czech Republic had to align itself with existing CFSP statements and 
positions even before accession. As a member state, the Czech Republic takes part in 
CFSP and ESDP deliberations (and operations), and it is expected to coordinate its 
foreign policy decision-making with other EU governments. Membership in the EU has 
involved the Czech Republic in a range of foreign policy issues in which it previously 
had little interest or engagement. It has also given a relatively small country enhanced 
possibilities for achieving its foreign policy goals through collective EU action. 
  29  Nevertheless, our survey of Czech foreign policy since 1989 does not provide much 
evidence that Czech foreign policy has been “Europeanized,” if by this we mean EU 
influence on the substance and orientation of Czech foreign policy. Indeed, while the 
EU provides a new supranational context and possibilities for Czech foreign policy, the 
EU influence on Czech foreign policy decision-making appears to be relatively small 
compared to domestic political factors. What has changed over time is not the level of 
EU influence, but the nature of the domestic factors influencing foreign policy. While in 
the initial years after the Velvet Revolution prominent individuals – especially the two 
Václavs, Havel and Klaus – exerted a strong influence on Czech foreign policy, since 
the late 1990s political parties and partisan politics seem to be playing a larger role. This 
may be due to the growing strength of political parties and the party system, but it also 
undoubtedly reflects the achievement of EU membership in 2004, which has lifted the 
constraints on foreign policy dissension and debate imposed by the overriding goal of 
EU membership. The impact of domestic politics on Czech foreign policy is also shown 
by the collapse of the Topolánek government in March 2009 – the outcome of political 
score-settling and partisan maneuvering in a still maturing political system – which 
undermined the Czech Republic’s ability to conduct an effective EU presidency and use 
it to achieve key foreign policy goals. 
  Moreover, despite EU membership the Czech Republic is still prone to make key 
foreign policy decisions outside of the EU framework, especially when these involve 
the United States and concern core foreign and security policy interests. This tendency 
is most notable in the case of the Czech government’s support for US policy on Iraq in 
early 2003 – although admittedly this episode took place before Czech accession to the 
EU, and before the EU had a formal position on the issue – and the government’s 
decision in 2006-2008 to negotiate unilaterally with the United States on the placement 
of missile defense facilities in the Czech Republic, without consulting with fellow EU 
member states. What these two instances indicate is that rather than a reflexe 
communautaire, when it comes to core foreign and security policy interests, Czech 
foreign policy is still more driven by a reflexe atlantique. Also reflecting a reflexe 
atlantique is the Czech Republic’s continued preference for NATO over ESDP as the 
foundation for European security and defense, although it also favors a strong EU 
security and defense identity within NATO. 
  In addition to NATO, the Czech Republic makes ample use of other international 
organizations and multilateral forums to promote its foreign policy interests, including 
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Republic’s activism on international human rights, which successive governments have 
identified as a key foreign policy interest. However, the Czech promotion of human 
rights has not always been welcomed by other EU member states. In the case of Cuba, 
for instance, Czech criticisms of the Cuban regime have upset Spain, which claims for 
itself a special knowledge and expertise in Latin America. Czech criticisms of Russia 
for human rights violations and nondemocratic practices have also run up against the 
objections of other (mainly Western) European governments who are more reluctant to 
antagonize Moscow. 
  EU integration also does not appear to have significantly altered basic perceptions 
of Czech foreign policy interests. For the most part, these continue to be determined by 
(pre-1989) historical experience and perceptions of geopolitical vulnerability, which 
remain essentially unchanged even after attaining the goal of EU membership. On the 
other hand, since becoming a member state the Czech Republic has sought to use the 
EU to achieve its own foreign policy goals, as have other member states. Since joining 
the EU, the Czech Republic has pushed for EU action on each of its main foreign policy 
priorities, including the stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans, increased 
partnership with Eastern Europe, enhanced energy security, improved transatlantic 
relations and greater cooperation between the EU and NATO, the expansion of free 
trade, and the promotion of international human rights. All of these issues were 
designated priorities for the Czech EU presidency in the first half of 2009, which gave 
the Czech Republic its best opportunity to influence the EU’s foreign policy agenda.  
  What explains or accounts for the limited Europeanization of Czech foreign policy? 
The most obvious explanation would be the limited amount of time which has passed 
since the Czech Republic joined the EU in May 2004, creating little opportunity for 
socialization within the EU framework to occur. While the process of alignment with 
EU foreign policy began well before accession, this was largely a rhetorical exercise 
with limited socialization effects. Moreover, the socialization which has occurred, in the 
pre-accession period and after accession, has affected mainly Czech government 
officials posted to Brussels or working within EU institutions, and has not penetrated 
deeply into the national bureaucracy or the political parties, to say nothing of public 
opinion. However, the experience of the EU presidency in early 2009 does appear to 
have been an invaluable learning experience for many ODS politicians, especially for 
some of its more Euroskeptical ministers.
16 When it comes to the Czech preference for 
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already socialized within the structures of NATO, which the Czech Republic joined in 
1999 (Khol 2004: 43). Thus, the prior socialization effects within NATO may be 
impeding or competing with the socialization process within EU institutions. EU 
socialization may also have been impeded by the relatively limited experience of Czech 
politicians and government officials with international organizations more generally – 
something which may account for the seemingly more rapid socialization of foreign 
policy decision-makers in other small countries (Austria, Sweden, and Finland) which 
joined the EU in 1995, having already accumulated considerable experience in 
international institutions and multilateral structures. 
  Another factor limiting Europeanization could be the Czech Republic’s peculiar 
historical experience and geopolitical situation. As a relatively small country that has 
been repeatedly victimized in the past by larger powers, the Czech Republic finds 
comfort and protection within the EU. Nevertheless, it remains wary of big power 
domination, even within the democratic structures of the EU. It thus takes care to assert 
and protect its own interests, and it is especially sensitive to perceived infringements of 
its recently-regained sovereignty – as indicated by the sharp response of the Czech 
government to French criticism of its early support for US policy on Iraq. The 
experience of Soviet domination, and of the failure of Western European powers to 
defend Czech interests in the past, also help explain the Czech Republic’s wariness 
towards Russia and the priority it attaches to NATO and strong transatlantic relations.  
  The limited Europeanization of Czech foreign policy is particularly evident in the 
relative weight accorded to Washington versus Europe on security issues. However, the 
passage of time and the pull of geography could alter this balance over the years in 
favor of Europe. According to one Czech foreign policy expert, “The importance of 
transatlantic links is often considerably overestimated [in the Czech Republic] as we 
will never play a key role in US strategic thinking. We will never be able to build a 
privileged relationship with anyone else [like the UK has with the US], we will never 
have to choose – Europe is our only option” (David Král, cited in Hughes 2003). A 
similar prediction is made by the Anglo-American historian, Tony Judt: “Geography 
will triumph over history. It will eventually matter more to the Eastern Europeans to be 
in the favor of Brussels [than the US], because day to day they will need Brussels” 
(Darnton 2004: A1). Indeed, some evidence that such rebalancing is already occurring 
may be provided by the repositioning of Czech policy on the Iraq war after February 
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prime minister – and the strong domestic and partisan opposition to US missile defense 
plans after 2006. 
  It is also possible that over time EU membership will alter Czech perceptions of 
geopolitical vulnerability, as the experience of Soviet domination fades and ties to 
larger EU powers, especially Germany and France, improve. This will be even more the 
case if the EU is successful in developing common strategies to improve relations with 
Russia, stabilize and integrate its southeastern and eastern borderlands, enhance energy 
security, and build a credible European security and defense capacity. 
  In the final analysis, therefore, the increased socialization of Czech foreign and 
security policy actors within EU institutions, combined with a reconsideration of basic 
foreign policy interests as a consequence of the accumulated experience of EU 
membership, could indeed promote a gradual Europeanization of Czech foreign policy. 
This process is sure to take time, however, and will also be influenced by the extent to 
which Czech domestic politics and public opinion also become Europeanized. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 On the role played by perceptions of vulnerability and weakness in determining a 
country’s foreign policy preferences, especially its “choices for Europe,” see Haughton 
(2008: 12-13).  
 
2 For further information on Czechoslovak foreign policy in the pre-1989 period, see 
Vykoukal, Litera and Tejchman (2000), Křen (2005), Service (2008), Judt (2008), 
Veselý (2001), Vondrová (1995-97), Kaplan (2004), Kaplan (2002), and Prokš (2001).  
 
3 Public support for NATO membership in the Czech Republic was only slightly above 
50 per cent in the period preceeding the country’s accession to the alliance (STEM 
2003: 5). 
 
4 The Commission’s annual “Progress Reports” for the Czech Republic and the other 
2004 entrants are available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/index_archive_en.htm. 
 
5 See Šedivý (1998), for the views of the foreign minister of the Tošovský government 
(January-June 1998) on the foreign policy priorities of the Czech Republic, including 
renewed engagement in international organizations, greater emphasis on the “European 
dimension” of Czech foreign policy, and reinvigorated central European regional 
cooperation. For the foreign policy priorities of the first ČSSD government (1998-
2002), see MFA (1999). On the revival of Visegrad Group cooperation after 1997, see 
Dangerfield (2008: 643-7). 
 
6 On Czech government activities in the UN, especially in the area of human rights, see 
the annual reports on Czech foreign policy issued by the MFA and posted on its official 
Web site at 
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/reports_and_documents/reports_on_the_cz
ech_foreign_policy/index.html. In all the annual reports since 1998 there has been a 
section dedicated to Czech foreign policy and human rights. 
 
7 Initially a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense unit; and later a field hospital in 
Basra and a military police unit to train Iraqi forces.   39
                                                                                                                                               
 
8 In March 2003, 70 per cent of Czechs opposed the Iraq war (CVVM 2005). For a 
detailed analysis of the Czech position on the Iraq war, see Handl (2003); also Král and 
Pachta (2004). 
 
9 On 17 March 2009, the Czech government decided to postpone ratification of the 
missile defense agreement, in part because of uncertainty about the Obama 
administration’s commitment to the plan (CES 2009: 4). 
 
10 On the security views of the 2002-2006 ČSSD-led government, see MFA (2003), 
especially pp. 8-9. 
 
11 According to a spring 2008 Eurobarometer poll, only 34 per cent of Czechs supported 
Turkey’s EU membership, just slightly above the 31 per cent EU average. 
 
12 The Priorities of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (June 2007-June 2008) 
are available on the Visegrad Group Web site: 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=942&articleID=9497&ctag=articlelist
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